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Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr. is a partner in the Boston law firm of Morgan, Brown & 
Joy, a firm exclusively devoted to the practice of labor and employment law representing 
management.  
 
 
Throughout his career, Mr. DiGiovanni has specialized in representing institutions of 
higher education on labor and employment matters and is counsel to numerous 
institutions in the Northeast, including Harvard University, Brandeis University, Tufts 
University, the University of Vermont, University System of New Hampshire, 
Providence College and Rutgers, among many others.   
 
His work has included the negotiations of numerous faculty and staff collective 
bargaining agreements for various colleges and universities, and representation of 
institutions in arbitration, agency hearings and court proceedings. 
 
He is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Association of College and 
University Attorneys and is a frequent speaker on labor relations and employment law 
issues. 
 
Mr. DiGiovanni holds a B.A. (summa cum laude) from Providence College (1970) and 
received his J.D. from Cornell University Law School in 1973. 
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NLRB Appointments 
 
 Since January 2008, the five-member NLRB has been operating with only two 
members, Wilma Liebman (D) and Peter Schaumber (R). On March 27, 2010, President 
Obama announced his intent to recess appoint 15 nominees to administrative posts, 
including two members of the National Labor Relations Board:  Craig Becker (D) and 
Mark Pearce (D). Even though President Obama had also nominated Brian Hayes (R) to 
sit on the Board as a fifth member, he did not recess appoint Mr. Hayes. Democratic pro-
labor members of the Board will now hold a 3-1 majority with one seat left to fill. 
Becker, Associate General Counsel to the SEIU and staff counsel to the AFL-CIO, had 
been vehemently opposed by Republicans in the past, partly based on arguments that his 
legal writings have suggested that employers have no role in union representation cases 
and that NLRB rulemaking might force employers to recognize unions based on card 
check majorities.    
 
 Because of the vacancies, the Board over the past two years has avoided seriously 
controversial cases, and, even with the cases heard, challenges have reached the Supreme 
Court that a two-member Board did not have the authority to issue any decisions. 
However, with a majority of the Board now appointed, it is likely that more controversial 
decisions will wind their way up the docket. These include a host of cases decided over 
the past 10 years or so that have tilted in management’s favor rather than labor. Among 
these are: 
 
1. Brown University. 342 NLRB No. 42, 175 LRRM 1089 (2004), where the 
Board, in a 3-2 decision, reversed its decision in New York University, 332 NLRB No. 
111 (2000), and held that graduate students working as teaching assistants or research 
assistants are not employees covered by the Act. The Board majority held that such 
individuals “have a predominantly academic rather than economic relationship with their 
school.”  
 
 2. Oakwood Healthcare Center, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006), where the NLRB 
clarified its stance on when an individual is deemed a “supervisor” and thus excluded 
from the coverage of the Act, and provided a liberal interpretation of who would qualify 
as a supervisor. Labor contends that many individuals who have marginal authority have 
been denied the right to organize under this decision. 
 
3. IBM Corp., 341 NLRB No. 148 (June 9, 2004), where the Board reversed 
Epilepsy Foundation.  In IBM Corporation, the Board decided that the precedent of 
Epilepsy Foundation should be overruled, and, by a 3-2 majority, the Board concluded 
that the Weingarten rights do not extend to a workplace where employees are not 
represented by a union.   
 
4. The Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), where the Board held that 
employees have no statutory right to use an employer’s email system, and thus, an 
employer could regulate its use by prohibiting employee use of the system for non-job 
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related solicitation. In that case, even though employees used the email system for 
personal communication, a rule banning its use for solicitation was still deemed 
appropriate as long as it was not discriminatorily enforced. 
 
The dissent argued that email was the virtual lunch room of the 21st century and that 
any restrictions on employee use of the system for union solicitation, especially when 
personal use was allowed, should be presumptively discriminatory and illegal under the 
long line of cases dealing with employee solicitation. 
 
5. Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 NLRB 906 (2004), where the Board held 
that supervisory pro-union activity is objectionable conduct when it interferes in the 
freedom of choice so as to materially affect the election outcome. It also held that 
supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards is inherently coercive absent 
mitigating circumstances. The majority opinion said that the Board would look to 
whether the supervisory conduct was generally interfering with employee free choice, 
and whether such conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent it materially 
affected the election outcome.  
 
The dissent contended that supervisory solicitation of union cards should not be 
inherently coercive, even when the person is unaware that he or she is a true statutory 
supervisor or where that status is unclear.  Furthermore, the dissent would look at such 
cases in the total context of the employer’s anti-union campaign. 
 
A reversal of this decision could mean a greater involvement by supervisors, 
especially first line supervisors, in soliciting for a union. It would mean that supervisors 
might actively campaign for a union and not be found to be violating the Act.  
 
6. Tradesmen International, 338 NLRB 460 (2002). There are numerous Board 
cases in which employer work rules are scrutinized to determine whether or not they 
interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in collective activity. At issue in 
Tradesman was whether the following employer rules would “reasonably chill employees 
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights”:  (1) prohibition of disloyal, disruptive, 
competitive or damaging conduct; (2) prohibition of slanderous or detrimental 
statements; (3) requirement that employees represent the employer in a positive manner. 
 
The Board held that these rules did not violate the Act because they serve a legitimate 
business purpose and reasonable employees would not construe such rules as intended to 
proscribe Section 7 activity. The dissent thought otherwise, arguing that such rules do 
chill employees in organizing and coming together for collective action to improve the 
workplace.  The dissent would require an employer to specifically state that such rules do 
not include Section 7 activity. 
  
 7. Dana Corporation and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, 
and Agricultural Implement Workers, 351 NLRB No. 28 (9-29-07), where the Board 
modified its recognition bar doctrine in cases where the union’s original majority status 
was based on a card check rather than a Board-supervised election. In the case of Board-
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supervised secret ballot elections, no Board election can be held in the bargaining unit for 
at least 12 months following the election. But in cases where an employer voluntarily 
recognizes a union, the rules barring a decertification petition had been less clear. Under 
prior law, an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union, in good faith and based on a 
demonstrated majority status, immediately bars an election petition filed by an employee 
or a rival union “for a reasonable period of time” [Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 
NLRB 583 (1966)]. Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated during this insulated 
period bars Board elections for up to three years of the contract’s term. 
 
In Dana, the Board said it will strike a balance between the interest of employee 
free choice and the promotion of stable labor relations. It established a policy that no 
election bar will be imposed after a voluntary card check agreement unless 1) employees 
in the unit are given notice of the recognition and of their right, within 45 days, to file a 
decertification petition; and 2) 45 days pass from the date of notice without the filing of a 
petition. Thus, unlike Board supervised elections, in cases where there is a card check 
recognition, disgruntled employees or rival unions who wish to file a decertification may 
immediately do so within a 45-day window period. Once that period passes, however, the 
union’s majority status will be irrebuttably presumed for a reasonable period of time to 
enable the parties to engage in negotiations for a first collective bargaining agreement. 
Once any such agreement is reached, such a contract will further bar elections for up to 
three years. 
 
These and many other cases will be ripe for review once the full Obama Board is 
constituted.1 
 
Impact on Yeshiva University cases.  Finally, the new appointees may have an 
impact on questions of faculty managerial authority. Because it is a Supreme Court 
decision, and not an NLRB case, it is unlikely that Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 
(1980) will be reversed anytime soon, given the current constituency of the Court. 
However, Yeshiva never stood for the proposition that all private sector faculty members 
are banned from collective bargaining. The issue of whether or not faculty members at 
any particular institution are managerial employees is still dealt with on a case by case 
basis by the NLRB. While the Supreme Court gave guidance as to what to examine in 
establishing managerial status, a pro-labor board may hold colleges to a subtly higher 
standard of proof simply in its interpretation of the rich fact patterns that these cases 
present. 
 
 Stay tuned. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1  An excellent summary of these and other cases can be found in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s report, 
“The National Labor Relations Board in the Obama Administration: What Changes to Expect.” (Sept., 
2009), by Harold Coxson and Christopher Coxson of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak and Steward, P.C. 
 
5
DiGiovanni: Legal Issues
Published by The Keep, 2010
 6 
Arbitration and Discrimination Claims: Post-Pyett Cases 
 
Last year at this conference we discussed the then-recently issued decision in 14 
Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), a case that involved the question of whether 
an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and 
unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act is enforceable. The Second Circuit had found this type of clause 
unenforceable (See 14 Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co., 498 F. 3d 88, (2nd Cir., 2007). 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the Second Circuit and held that the 
clause was enforceable. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion in which 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito and Kennedy joined.   
 
Over the past year, there have been some cases dealing with the aftermath of the 
Pyett case and its implications. 
 
 
Kravar v. Triangle Servs. Inc., (S.D.N.Y., No. 1:06-cv-07858, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 
May 19, 2009) 
 
 
 This case was considered by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York. The judge held that the situation fell within the exception to the enforceability 
of union-negotiated arbitration agreements that was expressly noted in Pyett, and 
therefore this plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate her discrimination claim. 
 
 The case arose when Triangle Services decided not to offer Eva Kravar a daytime 
cleaning position at the new headquarters of Bloomberg L.P. Ms. Kravar, who is 
Slovakian, was sixty-two years old at the time, and had worked for more than twenty-five 
years as a daytime cleaner at the previous Bloomberg headquarters. She also had some 
physical limitations as a result of abdominal surgery. Ms. Kravar alleged that Triangle 
illegally discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin, failed to reasonably 
accommodate her disability (her disability being the limitations resulting from surgery), 
and retaliated against her for filing a charge with the EEOC.  
 
 Ms. Kravar was covered by a collective bargaining agreement and was 
represented by the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ. The agreement 
had the following language: 
 
There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason 
of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership or 
any other characteristic protected by law, including but not limited to, claims 
made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the NY State 
Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code… or any other 
similar laws, rules or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the grievance 
and arbitration procedures as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. 
6
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Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims 
of discrimination.  
 
Under the contract language, only the Union could bring a claim to arbitration. An 
individual union member had no unfettered right to demand arbitration of a 
discrimination claim. The only option for an individual union member seeking arbitration 
was to present the claim to the union, “which ‘may’ demand arbitration, presumably if it 
finds the claim colorable.” 
 
 Triangle filed a motion to compel arbitration in light of Pyett, claiming that the 
situation fit squarely within the Court’s holding that “a collective bargaining agreement 
that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [ADEA] claims is 
enforceable as a matter of federal law.”  
 
 The court considered Pyett, where the Supreme Court stated “the decision to 
resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the 
statutory right… it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the first instance.” 
However, in Pyett the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether “the 
[agreement] operate[d] as a substantive waiver,” but noted that “a substantive waiver of 
federally protected rights will not be upheld.” The Supreme Court instead remanded the 
matter for further proceedings.  
 
 In light of Pyett the court determined it was necessary to decide if the agreement 
in the present case operated as a substantive waiver of Kravar’s discrimination claim. The 
court stated that “there [was] little question that if [the] union prevented [Ms. Kravar] 
from arbitrating” her claim, the provision could not be enforced against her. 
 
 The only evidence on the matter was a sworn declaration from Ms. Kravar where 
she stated that “her union declined to prosecute her claims.” She stated that she told her 
union representative that she wanted to arbitrate her disability claims but his response 
was to laugh and tell her she could not. The union representative “was unable to confirm 
or deny that this exchange occurred.” In his testimony, he sated that he “did not recall.” 
The court found that the record, though sparse, supported the conclusion that the 
agreement operated as a substantive waiver, precluding Ms. Kravar from raising her 
disability discrimination claim in any forum.  
 
The current record is sparse, but it only supports a single conclusion: the CBA 
here operated to preclude Ms. Kravar from raising her disability discrimination 
claim in any forum. As such, the CBA operated as a waiver over Ms. Kravar’s 
substantive rights, and may not be enforced. See, Pyett, 129 S.Ct. at 1474; Gilmer, 
500 U.S. at 29 
 
 The court also disagreed with Triangle’s argument that the agreement should be 
enforced because, even though the union was not willing to arbitrate the claim, Triangle 
was willing to arbitrate the claim. “The arbitration provision that the Court must enforce 
is the one the union… entered into, not a hypothetical agreement in which the employer’s 
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rather than the union’s consent is critical.” The court refused to enforce the agreement 
and denied Triangle’s motion to compel arbitration.  
 
 
 
Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distribution, 2009 WL 1653533 (USDC, Minn., 2009) 
 
 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted in part the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, relying on an arbitrator’s findings in an 
earlier grievance brought by the plaintiff-employee pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement.  
 
 Tewolde, an employee of Owens & Minor who worked as a material handler, 
grieved his termination from Owens & Minor to the Union and later filed a lawsuit in the 
district court alleging national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII and state 
laws, as well as retaliation. Both the grievance and the lawsuit arose from the same facts.  
 
 Tewolde’s position as a material handler required him to receive and stock 
products, pick products for customer orders, prepare the orders for shipment, and 
occasionally clean the warehouse. The material handlers use an electronic device to keep 
track of orders, and then pick the order from the stock; each order is considered a “line.” 
Sometimes an order is too big to be picked at once, and the handler will break it down 
into the necessary number of subdivisions in order to prepare the order for shipping, and 
in such an instance each subdivision is a “line.” The electronic device contains an “M 
key” to help the handlers keep track of lines in order to prevent errors. Owens & Minor 
had an expectation that employees pick 320 lines per eight-hour shift with no more than 
one error for every 1,000 lines picked.  
 
 Owen & Minor had a collective bargaining agreement with Minnesota’s Health 
Care Union Local 113 SEIU which governed the relationship between Owen & Minor 
and material handlers (among other positions). The agreement provided that during the 
first 90-days of employment there would be a probationary period where the employee 
did not pay union dues and could be terminated with or without cause, but thereafter 
could be terminated only with “just cause.” Just cause included dishonesty and 
falsification of reports, records, or applications. The agreement also mandated a process 
for filling job vacancies which required Owen & Minor to post qualifications for the job 
and that no employees who have worked for less than 120 days in their existing job 
would be eligible for the vacant position.  
 
 Shortly after Tewolde’s 90-day probationary period ended, the warehouse 
manager posted a signup sheet for the vacant position of lead material handler. Tewolde 
was the first employee to sign the sheet and the warehouse manager removed the signup 
sheet the next day. The warehouse manager told other employees that Tewolde’s name 
had been scratched off the signup sheet and that another material handler had signed up. 
As a result, Tewolde filed a complaint with human resources alleging that the warehouse 
8
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manager was discriminating against him based on his “culture, ethnicity and English-
speaking capabilities.” The day after Tewolde filed a complaint the warehouse manager 
formally disciplined Tewolde for the firm time by filing a corrective action form for 
Tewolde’s picking errors.  
 
 A few weeks later general manager informed Tewolde by letter that he had not 
been selected as lead material handler because he had not been employed for at least 120 
days as the collective bargaining agreement required and because he did not posses the 
necessary skills required to perform the job. The position was not given to the other 
employee who signed up because he also did not meet the 120 day requirement. 
 
 The position remained vacant and the warehouse manager posted the position 
with a signup sheet again a few months later to correspond with the other employee’s 
120th day.  Tewolde and the other employee both signed up and were both interviewed. 
The warehouse manager told Tewolde he was not qualified and hired the other employee 
as lead material handler.  
 
 In the time after Tewolde was denied the promotion, he was not meeting the lines 
per-shift requirement and was failing to meet safety orders. Tewolde was notified of this 
and the next week his productivity increased. However, it was reported that Tewolde’s 
productivity increased because he was misusing the electronic device to inflate the 
number of lines. Tewolde was suspended pending further investigation and terminated 
shortly after. 
 
  The day after his termination Tewolde filed his grievance regarding termination 
with the union. The case was processed to arbitration. The arbitrator determined that 
Tewolde was not minimally qualified for the lead position because he had too high an 
error right and denied the grievance. 
 
 However, the following year Tewolde filed a second grievance with the union. 
The arbitrator denied that grievance as well stating that Tewolde misused the electronic 
device to inflate his production numbers and that Tewolde was properly terminated 
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. 
 
 Tewolde then filed a complaint alleging national origin discrimination and 
retaliation (“reprisal” in Minnesota) in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act (“MHRA”).  Following receipt of a right to sue letter, Tewolde commenced 
action in U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.  
 
 In his Title VII claims, Tewolde alleged that Owens & Minor discriminated 
against him based on his national origin by refusing to make him a lead material handler 
on both occasions that he was denied the position, and that Owens & Minor retaliated 
against him for his charge of discrimination with corrective actions and his subsequent 
suspension and termination. To support his Title VII claims, Tewolde argued that he was 
qualified for the position of lead material handler and that he was not terminated for just 
cause.  
9
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 Owens & Minor filed for summary judgment claiming, among other things, that 
Tewolde could not advance his Title VII claims before the court because the arbitrators’ 
decisions preclude such arguments. 
 
 In its decision, the Court examined the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gardner-
Denver and more recently in Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett and agreed with the company that 
the previous arbitrators’ decisions precluded Tewolde from making those arguments.  
  
 The Court first reviewed the history of the effect of arbitration awards on latter 
litigation, noting the long road beginning in 1974 with Gardner-Denver. In reviewing the 
Penn Plaza v Pyett decision, however, the Court noted that the Supreme Court had 
looked more favorably on the ability of arbitrators to examine statutory discrimination 
issues.  
 
In effect, 14 Penn Plaza subjects an arbitrator’s decision interpreting and applying 
a CBA that expressing incorporates federal antidiscrimination law to highly 
deferential review on appeal….. If an arbitrator’s actions can directly limit 
judicial review of federal antidiscrimination laws, deference to an arbitrator’s 
interpretation and application of a CBA in a later-filed federal court action is 
warranted even if that deference precludes an employee’s statutory claims. … 
Therefore, a court affords an arbitrator’s decision interpreting and applying the 
terms of a CBA “an extraordinary level of deference” in a later Title VII action in 
federal courts and confirms the decision ‘so long as the arbitrator is even arguably 
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority’ 
[citations omitted]. 
 
In the case at hand, the Court found that the arbitrators acted within the scope of their 
authority and their decisions were entitled to substantial deference. 
 
 The court then determined the Tewolde could not establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination as required by the McDonnell-Douglas framework. In light of the 
arbitrator’s finding that Tewolde was not minimally qualified for the lead position, 
Tewolde could not demonstrate that he was qualified for the promotion – an element of 
his claim. 
 
 The court also found that with respect to his claim of retaliation, stemming from 
allegations that in response to his charge of discrimination Tewolde was “assigned more 
difficult orders, required to clean more than other pickers, disciplined, suspended and 
terminated,” the arbitrator’s findings warranted summary judgment. The court deferred to 
the arbitrator’s finding that “Tewolde was not treated differently from other workers with 
respect to ‘cleaning and related duties.’” 2 
                                               
2 The court granted summary judgment on the two claims, but denied summary judgment with regard to 
Tewolde’s other claim of reprisal, in which he alleged that in response to his complaint of discrimination to 
human resources the warehouse manager took formal disciplinary action for the first time. The court found 
10
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Americans with Disabilities Act and reasonable accommodations 
 
Fiumara v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2009 WL 1163851 (1st Cir. 
2009) 
 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held last year that an indefinite 
leave of absence was not a “reasonable accommodation” under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and state law. It also confirmed that the ADA does not trump collective 
bargaining rights, and that a requested accommodation that would violate the seniority 
rights of fellow unionized employees will not be required under the law. 
 
 A Harvard University employee, John Fiumara, filed suit against Harvard 
alleging failure to accommodate his disability in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 151B; retaliation in violation of Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ch. 151B; and breach of contract, among other claims. The district court allowed 
Harvard’s motion for summary judgment and Fiumara appealed. 
 
Fiumara was employed by Harvard as a full-time temporary employee and during 
the relevant time period occupied a position operating the “family van.” The position 
required that Fiumara have a Commercial Driver’s License (“CDL”). Fiumara’s alleged 
disability resulted from an incident in which he slipped on the steps of the “family van” 
and injured both knees. Harvard granted him 12 weeks of medical leave and held his 
position open for 6 months. During the time he was out, Fiumara’s physicians “regularly 
informed Harvard that he was not cleared to return to work,” and Fiumara let his CDL 
expire. Shortly before Fiumara was terminated, he agreed to have a medical examination 
and return to work, but he cancelled the medical appointment without informing Harvard 
that he planned to reschedule it in a few weeks. 
  
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on the failure to accommodate 
claims because “Fiumara failed to show that he was a qualified individual under the 
ADA” and the Massachusetts state law standards are the same as the ADA standards. 
Fiumara did not hold a CDL, a requirement for his job, and failed to request permission 
to reschedule his medical examination in a “direct and specific” manner. The only 
accommodations that Fiumara sought were a van driver position3 or additional leave. 
Neither accommodation was a “reasonable accommodation.”  The Court wrote: 
 
An accommodation that inherently breaches existing employee agreements is not 
a reasonable accommodation. See Laurin v. Providence Hospital, 150 F. 3d 52 
(1st Cir., 1998). Similarly, indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA. See Watkins v. J& S Oil, 164 F. 3d 55, 61 (1st Cir., 1998). 
                                                                                                                                            
that Tewolde had established his prima facie case of reprisal. That claim had not been reviewed in 
arbitration. 
 
3 As s unionized employee, Fiumara was not an eligible bidder for the van job under the provisions of the 
CBA. He was not senior to other employees who had greater rights under the CBA.  
11
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Harvard was neither required to give Fiumara a position as a bus driver nor to 
grant Fiumara an indefinite leave.4 
 
The court of appeals also affirmed summary judgment on the Massachusetts 
retaliation claim because Fiumara did not show any evidence suggesting that he was 
engaged in protected behavior. The court of appeals did not discuss the breach of contract 
or other claims.  
 
 
Discharge of Tenured Faculty Member Upheld. 
 
 
Bernold v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, -- SE 2d ---, 2009 
WL 3320312 (NC App.Ct., 2009) 
 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the Wake County 
Superior Court’s decision to uphold the University of North Carolina’s Board of 
Governors' decision upholding a tenured professor’s discharge.  
 
Leonhard Bernold was a professor in the Department of Civil, Construction and 
Environmental Engineering at North Carolina State University. Bernold had been a 
tenured professor since 1996. The University adopted post-tenure review regulations in 
2002 which provided that “unsatisfactory reviews in two consecutive years or any three 
out of five years ‘will constitute evidence of the professional incompetence of the 
individual and may justify… discharge for cause.’” Bernold received post-tenure review 
findings of “does not meet expectations” in 2002, 2003, and 2004. He was then 
discharged for incompetent teaching and incompetent service.  
  
After his discharge, Bernold requested a hearing before the faculty hearing 
committee. The committee found unanimously that he was not an incompetent teacher, 
but found that he had provided incompetent service by a 3 to 2 vote. The University’s 
chancellor upheld these findings and remanded the matter to the Department of Civil, 
Construction and Environmental Engineering for a recommendation on whether to 
discharge Bernold based solely on the finding of incompetent service. The committee 
then held an additional hearing on the issue of petitioner’s service and found that 
petitioner was “not incompetent in the area of service” by a 4 to 1 vote. This time, the 
chancellor reversed the committee’s decision and the University’s Board of Trustees 
affirmed the chancellor’s decision. The University’s Board of Governors affirmed the 
Trustees’ decision. Bernold sought judicial review in the Wake County Superior Court 
pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. §150B-51. The superior court affirmed the Board of 
Governor’s decision and Bernold appealed.  
                                               
4 The District Court below had noted that “a leave of absence and leave extensions are reasonable 
accommodations in some circumstances. Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals Inc., 212 F. 3d 638 (1st Circ., 
2000)…. However, an open-ended or indefinite leave extension is not reasonable. Fiumara v Harvard 
College  526 F.Supp. 150 (2007) 
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The appeals court addressed three arguments. Bernold first argued that the 
superior court erred in upholding his discharge on the grounds of lack of collegiality 
because tenured professor have a substantive due process right to protection from 
discharge for any reason other than incompetence, misconduct or neglect of duty. Section 
603 of the Code of the Board of Governors of UNC governs the due process requirements 
for tenured faculty facing discharge. Although Section 603(1) provides for discharge due 
to incompetence, misconduct or neglect of duty, Bernold’s argument failed because the 
University’s post-tenure review regulation specifies that “unsatisfactory reviews in two 
consecutive years or any three out of five wears ‘will constitute evidence of the 
professional incompetence…’” Bernold received unsatisfactory reviews three years in a 
row, which the court found was sufficient evidence of professional incompetence.  
 
The Court then noted that UNC based its ultimate discharge of the professor on 
“incompetence of service” which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the 
faculty, specifically alleging that “his interactions with colleagues had been so disruptive 
that the effective and efficient operation of his department was impaired.”  A regulation 
for the College of Engineering stated that “each faculty member is expected to work in a 
collegial manner.”  By such regulation, the petitioner was aware that collegiality “was a 
professional expectation for his position and that his collegiality or lack thereof was one 
possible focus of evaluation during his post-tenure reviews.”   His unsatisfactory post-
tenure reviews constituted “sufficient evidence of his professional incompetence to 
justify his discharge for cause.”  
 
Bernold also argued that the superior court erred in failing to find that the 
respondent violated his due process rights in its use of the review process to discharge 
him. Although Section 603 set forth the particular due process requirements for tenured 
faculty facing discharge, and did not mandate improvement plans, Bernold cited language 
from the University Policy Manual, Policy 400.3.3 which states that one purpose of post-
tenure review process is to “provide for a clear plan and timetable for improvement of 
performance of faculty found deficient.” Because the University did not provide a clear 
plan or timetable, Bernold alleged that his due process rights had been violated. However, 
the court found that the policy manual was not a set of due process requirements as was 
section 603, but rather a “list pf principles to guide the post-tenure review process.” 
Whether or not the University followed the policy manual, it did follow the requirements 
of 603 and thus did not violate Bernold’s due process rights.  
  
Bernold’s final argument was that the superior court erred in finding substantial 
evidence in the record to support his discharge for incompetence. However, Bernold 
merely offered evidence which would support a different outcome than that reached by 
the Board of Governors. The court rejected this last argument because the task of the 
reviewing court is only look for substantial evidence to support the decision reach, and 
the “whole record” contained “ample evidence that [Bernold] was disruptive to the point 
that the department’s function and operation were impaired.”5   The court noted: 
                                               
5 The Court wrote that “the whole record test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board’s 
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably  have 
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Petitioner relies on his argument that “lack of collegiality” cannot constitute 
incompetence; however, he cites no authority that disruptive behavior cannot 
constitute incompetence. Petitioner then draws our attention to evidence in the 
record showing petitioner’s positive interactions with some colleagues and 
explaining the reasons behind his negative interactions with others. Our task is not 
to comb the record for evidence that would support a different outcome from that 
reached by the Board, but rather to look for substantial evidence to support the 
decision. Here there is ample evidence that petitioner was disruptive to this point 
that his department’s function and operation were impaired. 
 
 
 
 
What survives expiration of collective bargaining agreements?   
Dues Checkoff and arbitration requirements 
 
 
Tribune Publishing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 564 F.3d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) 
 This case made it to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit when Tribune 
Publishing petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision that the Tribune had violated the 
NLRA by unilaterally discontinuing the use of the Company’s direct deposit system to 
collect union dues.  
 
 Tribune and the Graphic Communications International Union entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement which provided for payroll deduction of union dues upon 
written request of the employee. Thirty-seven employees filed written requests and paid 
union dues through dues checkoff. After the collective bargaining agreement expired, 
Tribune continued dues checkoff for about a month, and then discontinued payroll 
deduction of union dues informing the employees through a letter that “the Company was 
exercising its legal right.” 
 
 While the parties were bargaining for a new collective bargaining agreement, the 
union secretary-treasure obtained signed direct deposit authorization forms from those 
thirty-seven employees who had previously participated in dues checkoff. He took the 
forms to Tribune’s administrative manager who told the secretary-treasurer that it was “a 
good idea” to use direct deposit to pay union dues and accepted the forms for processing. 
Tribune effectuated this use of direct deposit for one pay period only. After the first pay 
period, the administrative manager sent a letter to the employees stating that direct 
deposit payment of union dues had been an error and it was to be discontinued because 
dues checkoff had been previously discontinued. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. Of 
Education, 292 N. C  406, 410 (1977) 
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 The union contended that Tribune violated the NLRA when it unilaterally 
discontinued the direct deposit of union dues. A NLRB administrative law judge 
determined that direct deposit of payroll deductions were working conditions of the union 
employees and that Tribune violated NLRA sections 8(a)(5) and (5) of the NLRA by 
ceasing to allow direct deposit because it changed the working conditions of those 
employees without affording the union an opportunity to bargain, as required. A three-
member panel of the NLRB reviewed and adopted the ALJ’s conclusion and noted that 
Tribune entered into a new agreement allowing for direct deposit of union dues after the 
collective bargaining agreement expired. 
  
 On appeal before the D.C. Circuit, Tribune argued that when it allowed 
employees direct deposit of union dues, it was simply reinstituting the dues checkoff 
provision from the expired agreement because direct deposit of union dues and dues 
checkoff accomplish the same result and are therefore “one and the same.” Since dues 
checkoff and direct deposit are the same, Tribune argued it could discontinue either 
because the collective bargaining agreement had expired. The employer was essentially 
arguing that, because it had the right to discontinue union dues deduction upon expiration 
of the union contract, when it stopped direct deposit of union dues it “once again 
exercised its right in the context of an expired collective bargaining agreement to cease 
deducting money from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues to the 
union.” If a company can cease dues deduction after a CBA expires, then “surely the 
employer has the same right to cease payroll deduction of union dues pursuant to an 
informal oral agreement reached during a contract hiatus.”  
 
 The NLRB, in response, argued that the real issue is not the expired CBA but the 
fact that the Tribune had reached a “new” agreement with the union for direct deposit of 
union dues and that, having made that agreement, the employer cannot unilaterally cease 
that practice.  
 
 The court first noted that the right of an employer to cease payroll deduction of 
union dues at the expiration of a union contract is beyond dispute [Bethlehem Steel Co., 
136 NLRB 1500 (1962)]. Of course, a company is also at liberty to continue such 
deductions even though a contract has expired. 
 
 Having noted that, the court did not accept the company’s argument that when it 
agreed to direct deposit it was merely “reinstituting” dues checkoff under the CBA and 
that it was as if it never has terminated dues checkoff. It then follows that the company 
could terminate the dues checkoff because that agreement was not expired. The court said 
that once the dues checkoff was terminated, it could not be reinstituted unilaterally. The 
practice could only be instituted again under a new agreement.   That new agreement was 
reached – and now it could not be terminated without negotiations with the union.  The 
court found that the board’s decision that the institution of direct deposit constituted a 
new agreement was supported by substantial evidence and upheld the decision.  
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 The court also rejected Tribune’s argument that section 302 of the LMRA does 
not authorize the use of direct deposit unless there is a written collective bargaining 
agreement, because Tribune cited no cases supporting such an argument.  
 
 
 
Reuters v. LLC Newspaper Guild, (US. District Court, SDNY) (10 Civ.0273 and 0639), 
March 9, 2010 
 
 Reuters Newspaper sought to stay two separate arbitration cases. One related to 
the failure of the newspaper to deduct union dues from employees’ paychecks; the other 
involves a grievance by a Reuters employees and a union member. The newspaper 
maintained that it was no longer obligated to arbitrate either of those cases because the 
collective bargaining agreement had expired.  
 
 The union, however, argued the cases were arbitrable because the collective 
bargaining agreement contained an “evergreen clause.” This clause specifically stated: 
 
"The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall remain in effect during such 
negotiations as required by applicable law." 
 
The court noted that an arbitrator does not have the power to resolve a grievance 
concerning “renewal” of the agreement, but found that the provision would not restrain 
the arbitrator or from interpreting existing clauses, including the evergreen provision. 
 
 
 
 
Burden of Proof in ADEA Cases 
 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) 
 
 In this case the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a 
plaintiff seeking a mixed-motive jury instruction under the ADEA must present direct 
evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain the instruction. The court did not 
directly address the question, but rather, in a 5-4 decision, found that a mixed-motive jury 
instruction is never proper in an ADEA case – whether the evidence of discrimination is 
direct or circumstantial.   
 
 The case arose when Jack Gross, who had been working for FBL since 1971, was 
reassigned from the position of claims administration director to the position of claims 
project coordinator in 2003. Gross was 54 years old at the time of the reassignment. At 
the same time that FBL reassigned Gross, it also transferred many of his previous job 
duties to a newly created position – claims administration manager. The position was 
then filled by a woman who had previously been supervised by Gross and who was in her 
early forties. Gross filed suit in district court alleging that his reassignment was a 
16
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 34
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss5/34
 17 
violation of the ADEA. At trial, Gross “introduced evidence suggesting that his 
reassignment was based at least in part on his age.” 
 
 The district court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for Gross if it 
determined that the reassignment was a demotion, and that his age was a motivating 
factor in FBL’s decision to demote him. The court gave further instructions that age was 
a motivating factor “if [it] played a part or a role in [FBL]’s decision to demote [him].” 
The court also instructed the jury on the burden shifting effect of a mixed-motive case; 
once Gross established that age was a motivating factor the burden was upon FBL to 
prove it would have made the same decision if age had not been a motivating factor.  
 
 FBL appealed, challenging the jury instructions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the jury should only have 
received a mixed-motive instruction if Gross had presented direct evidence of 
discrimination. Because Gross conceded that he did not present direct evidence, the 
mixed-motive instruction, including the instruction regarding the burden shifting to FBL, 
was improper. 
 
 Although the question presented on certiorari “was whether a plaintiff must 
plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive 
instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case,” the Supreme Court instead addressed 
whether mixed-motive instructions are ever proper in an ADEA case.  
 
 The Court refused to apply Title VII decisions regarding mixed-motive cases to 
the ADEA “because Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden of 
persuasion.” The Court noted that the Supreme Court first recognized the mixed-motive 
framework in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). There the Court held 
that if a Title VII plaintiff shows that discrimination was a “motivating” or a “substantial” 
factor in the employer’s action, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to 
show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible 
consideration. Justice O’Connor separately concurred that in order to shift the burden of 
persuasion to the employer, the employee must present “direct evidence that an 
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the employment decision.”  
  
 The Court found it significant that Congress amended Title VII to explicitly 
authorize mixed-motive discrimination claims6 but has not amended the ADEA to 
recognize such claims. Congress must have acted intentionally in doing so. 
 
 The Court observed that it had never held this burden-shifting framework 
applicable to ADEA claims, “and we decline to so now.” The Court stated that “unlike 
Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination 
                                               
6 Congress amended Title VII by explicitly authorizing discrimination claims in which an improper 
consideration was a “motivating” factor for an adverse employment decision. See 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-
2(m) (providing that an “unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for an employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice” (emphasis added). 
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by showing that age was simply a motivating factor,” and interpreted Congress’ decision 
not to amend the similar provisions in the ADEA to mean that the mixed-motive 
framework does not apply to cases brought under the ADEA. “When Congress amends 
one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”  
 
 The court also interpreted the plain language of the ADEA, “it shall be unlawful 
for an employer… to… discriminate… because of” age, and found that it required “but-
for” causation.  In ADEA cases, there is no shift in the burden of persuasion from the 
plaintiff to the defendant; the burdened of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged 
decision. The Court held that “a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
(which may be direct or circumstantial) that age was a “but-for” cause of the challenged 
employer decision. 
  
 The court also explicitly rejected the argument that, although the 1991 
Amendments codifying Price Waterhouse do not apply to the ADEA, Price Waterhouse 
itself should be controlling.     
 
 Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg and 
Breyer joined. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the ADEA as 
requiring “but-for” causation, and urged that the most natural reading of the plain 
language of the ADEA is that the statute “prohibits adverse employment actions 
motivated in whole or in part by the age of the employee.” The dissent pointed out that 
the Supreme Court rejected the “but-for” interpretation of identical language in Title VII 
in Price Waterhouse, and Congress rejected such an interpretation in enacting the 
amendments to Title VII in 1991. The dissent would apply the reasoning of Price 
Waterhouse and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.642 (1989) to the ADEA, 
and hold that a plaintiff bringing a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA need not 
present direct evidence in order to obtain a mixed-motives instruction.  
 
 The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s decision to answer a question that 
“was not the question [the court] granted certiorari to decide.” The question which the 
majority answered was raised for the first time in a brief and it is not the usual course of 
the court to answer questions “raised only in a merits brief.” 
 
 Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, in which Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
joined, explicitly stating that it was appropriate to apply the Price Waterhouse affirmative 
defense to ADEA claims because Congress only eliminated the defense with respect to 
Title VII claims.  
 
 
 
 
Application of Gross to Claims under the ADA 
 
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957.  (7th Cir., 2010) 
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 In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gross to a claim arising under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and found that the mixed-motive framework is not available in claims 
brought pursuant to the ADA. 
 
 Kathleen Serwatka filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin alleging that her former employer, Rockwell, discharged her because it 
regarded her as being disabled, in violation of the ADA.  After trial and deliberations, the 
jury answered “yes” to the following question on the special verdict form: “Did 
defendant terminate plaintiff due to its perception that she was substantially limited in her 
ability to walk or stand?” The jury also answered “yes” to the question “Would defendant 
have discharged plaintiff if it did not believe she was substantially limited in her ability to 
walk or stand, but everything else remained the same?” The district court decided the 
jury’s findings constituted a mixed-motive finding. Rockwell appealed arguing that the 
mixed-motive finding was improper in light of Gross and that if it were proper, the relief 
that Serwatka was awarded was improper.   
 
 The court, like the Supreme Court in Gross, discussed the landmark decision of 
Price Waterhouse and Congress’ subsequent amendments to Title VII in 1991. The court 
noted that, similar to the ADEA, Congress did not amend the ADA to expressly 
recognize mixed-motive decisions. Despite the similar “because of” language between 
the ADA and the ADEA, the court took a moment to discuss the enforcement provisions 
of the ADA because, unlike the ADEA, the enforcement provisions of the ADA cross-
reference the remedies provisions of Title VII, including the Title VII remedy provision 
which authorizes a court to award certain types of relief in mixed-motive cases. 
 
  In light of the importance that the Gross court placed on the “because of” 
language in the ADEA, the court found that the cross-reference to the mixed-motive 
remedy provision was not enough – there was no cross-reference to the provision 
recognizing employer liability for mixed-motive claims. The court interpreted Gross to 
mean that “when another anti-discrimination statute lacks comparable language [to the 
Title VII language], a mixed-motive claim will not be viable under that statute. The court 
also took note of another recent Seventh Circuit decision, McNutt v. Board of Trustees of 
University of Illinois, 141 F. 3d 706 (7th Cir., 1998), in which the court held that the 
Congressional amendments to Title VII recognized mixed-motive claims in substantive 
discrimination (race, gender, national origin), but not in retaliation claims. The court in 
McNutt held “the omission of retaliation claims from this new provision affects the relief 
courts can grant”  [Accord, see also, Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F. 3d  518 (7th Cir., 2009), 
(decided under Civil Rights Act of 1871; “but for” causation required.)]. 
 
 Compare, however, the recently issued decision in Smith v. Xerox Corp. (5th Cir., 
No. 08-11115, 3/24/10), where Fifth Circuit held that the mixed motive theory of liability 
is still available to prove retaliation under Title VII.  The “but for” causation is not 
required for such retaliation claims. 
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Statute of Limitations Issues under Title VII 
 
Gentry v. Jackson State University, 610 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D. Miss., 2009) 
 
 This case was filed by a professor at Jackson State University who was denied 
tenure in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Jackson State 
filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied 
the motion in part.  
 
 Dr. Laverne Gentry filed suit alleging that “she was denied tenure and a related 
salary increase because of her gender,” in violation of Title VII, §1981 and the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution. Gentry also asserted that Jackson 
University retaliated against her in violation of Title VII, and filed a state law claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
 
 The court dismissed plaintiff’s §1981 and equal protection claims because those 
claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court also dismissed the state law 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the plaintiff did not comply 
with the provisions of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act which requires any person with a 
claim for injury against a governmental entity to provide 90 days notice to the CEO of the 
entity.  
 
 However, the court did not dismiss Gentry’s Title VII claims because they fell 
within the purview of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. 7 
 
 The defendant argued that the Title VII claim that the denial of tenure was an 
adverse action taken because of the plaintiff’s gender should be dismissed because the 
denial of tenure occurred in 2004, but the plaintiff did not file her charge with the EEOC 
until 2006, which is beyond the 180 day requirement for the timely filing of a charge. 
However, the plaintiff contended that the denial of tenure negatively affected her 
compensation and therefore qualified as a compensation decision or other practice which 
affected her compensation. Although the court recognized that the denial of tenure was 
a discrete act, in light of the recently-enacted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, the 
                                               
7 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overturned Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 550 U.S. 618 
(2007), which had held that where there is no evidence that the employer “initially adopted its pay rate 
system in order to discriminate… or that it later applied this system … within the statutory time period with 
any discriminatory animus,’ the mere fact that “this discrimination reduced the amount of later paychecks” 
does not mean that “each new paycheck constitutes a new violation.”   The new law states: 
  
For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in 
compensation in violation of the Act, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice is adopted; when a person becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or 
other practice, or when a person is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation or 
practice, including each time wages, benefits or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or 
in part from such a decision or other practice. 
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court agreed with the plaintiff that it also denied her a salary increase which made it a 
compensation decision.  
 
Here, it can hardly be denied that the denial of tenure was a “discrete” act of 
which plaintiff was obviously aware. However, plaintiff has asserted that the 
denial of tenure also effectively denied her salary increases and hence was a 
compensation decision. Accordingly, the court concludes that it cannot grant 
summary judgment on the limitations basis urged by the University. Cf. Rehman 
v. SUNY, 596 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)(in cases involving allegations that 
defendant refused to propose the plaintiff for appointment to associate or full 
professor with tenure, the court held that although the plaintiff filed his EEOC 
charge on April 13, 2007, under the Ledbetter Act, his wage discrimination claims 
based upon actions occurring on or before April 13, 2005, two years, were timely, 
which claims presumably included the defendant’s refusal to consider him for 
tenure.); Shockley v. Miner, Civ Action 06-478, JJF, 2009 WL 866792 (D. Del 
March 31, 2009)(applying Ledbetter Act to failure to promote case); Bush v. 
Orange County Corrections Department, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Fla 
2009)[16 year old claims over demotion were not longer untimely under the new 
Act]. 
 
Because the decision amounted to a compensation decision, under the act, the 
discrimination claim was renewed with each paycheck, making the 2006 filing of the 
charge timely. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment of the Title VII 
discrimination claim. 
 
 The defendant also sought summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for gender 
discrimination based on pay disparity because the plaintiff was unable to identify 
appropriate male comparators. However, the court disagreed and found that summary 
judgment was not appropriate on that claim. The court also denied summary judgment on 
the retaliation despite the fact that the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative 
remedies because “it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies 
prior to urging a retaliation claim growing out of an earlier charge” (emphasis added). 
 
 
Mezu v. Morgan State University, No. 09-1447, 4th Cir., Court of appeal (unpublished 
decision, 2/19/10) 
 
 An associate professor's claim that she was discriminatorily denied promotion 
was dismissed because she failed to file within 300 days after being notified that her 
promotion was denied.  
 
 Rose Ure Mezu, who is of Nigerian origin, was notified on April 6, 2006 that she 
had been denied promotion to professor. She appealed internally and sued in federal court 
claiming violations of Title VII due to race and national origin discrimination. Her EEOC 
charge was filed on March 27, 2007, more than 300 days after being notified of the 
promotion denial.  
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 The Court affirmed the decision of the lower district court, which had dismissed 
her claims as untimely filed. The Court wrote: 
 
The time the initial employment decision was made and communicated triggered 
the commencement of the limitations period despite the pendency of the internal 
appeal and the possibility of reversal of the initial decision. Delaware State 
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980) 
 
* * * 
 We agree with the district court that Dr. Richardson’s letter post-marked April 6, 
2006 denying Mezu’s promotion to full professor, constituted the discrete act of 
failure to promote triggering the commencement of the limitation period despite 
the pendency of her internal appeal with the University. We further agree that the 
Provost and the Vice President Academic’s reaffirmation of her prior adverse 
recommendation to the President, as well as Defendant’s alleged failure to 
complete the internal appeal process, did not constitute independently 
discriminatory acts commencing the limitation period anew. 
 
The pendency of the internal appeal does not toll the running of the limitations 
period. [citing Ricks  and also IBEW v. Robbins and Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976), 
noting that the existence and utilization of grievance procedures under a union 
contract does not toll the running of the limitation period that would otherwise 
begin on the date the allegedly discriminatory act took place.) 
 
 
 
 
Non-reappointment considered an “adverse action” 
 
Leibowitz v. Cornell University, No. 07-4567-cv ,  ___ F. 3d___, Oct. 23, 2009) 
 
 
 This case was on appeal at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The 
plaintiff appealed a U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York decision 
granting summary judgment to the defendants. The court of appeals affirmed the district 
court’s order in part and vacated the order in part. 
  
 Leibowitz was an employee of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations (“ILR”) which is a “contract college” of Cornell University, funded by the 
State University of New York system. She began as an Extension Associate in 1983 and 
was promoted to the position of Senior Extension Associate II in 1987. Leibowitz’s 
employment was a term appointment, governed by the Cornell and ILR policy that senior 
extension associates “may be appointed to ‘terms of up to five years and may be 
reappointed on the basis of recommendations by the department.’” Leibowitz’s contract 
was renewed in 1992 and 1997. Each appointment letter explicitly stated that the 
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appointment was “for a finite term and was contingent upon funding.” Although the 
position was not tenured, plaintiff asserted that the position was equivalent to that of a 
tenured professor. Prior to the non-renewal of Leibowitz’s contract, defendants had never 
terminated, laid off, or failed to renew the contract of a Senior Extension Associate II 
without cause.  
 
 Because Leibowitz was teaching at the Ithaca campus but was based in New York 
City, Cornell reimbursed her travels costs. In 2001, Cornell was required to increase the 
amount of travel reimbursement to account for a policy which required Leibowitz to 
record travel reimbursement as taxable income. Leibowitz’s travel reimbursement was 
increased from $20,000 to $30,000. In June 2002 Cornell reminded Leibowitz that her 
contract was set to expire on October 31, 2002 and informed her that it would not be 
renewing her contract because of fiscal reasons; that she was assigned to Ithaca for the 
2002-2003 academic year; and that her employment would extend to May 31, 2003. 
Cornell made this decision despite the Long Island office’s interest in having Leibowitz 
work as a senior extension associate. The director of the Long Island office was eager to 
hire Leibowitz, but this interest was “certainly not considered [by Cornell].”  
 
 In early December 2002, Leibowitz informed Cornell that she intended to retire 
effective December 30, 2002. On December 20, 2002 she requested that she be able to 
rescind her retirement in order to be assigned to a position in the Long Island office. Her 
request was denied because of “fiscal circumstances.” Four days later, the director of the 
Long Island office wrote to Leibowitz to “confirm his offer to her” of a recently vacated 
position. Cornell informed Leibowitz that the offer was not valid and fired the director 
for making the offer. Leibowitz was not considered for any vacancies at all. Leibowitz 
filed suit in the district court alleging gender and age discrimination in violation of Title 
VII and state and municipal laws, and breach of contract, breach of implied-in-fact 
contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. The district court originally granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted; 
but this decision was reversed by the court of appeals and remanded for further 
proceedings. The district court then dismissed the action granting summary judgment for 
the defendants. Leibowitz again appealed.  
 
 The district court determined that Leibowitz could not prove the existence of an 
adverse action because she was unable to produce evidence that she had any right to 
any official or unofficial tenured position, and that the plaintiff could not show 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The district court also 
found that Leibowitz failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the defendants’ 
reasons for refusing to renew her contract were pretextual. The district court also 
dismissed all of Leibowitz’s contract claims.  
 
 On appeal, the court found that the district court was incorrect in ruling that 
the non-renewal of her contract did not constitute an adverse employment action. The 
district court had concluded that the plaintiff did not demonstrate an unofficial policy of 
tenure for employees in the position of Senior Extension Associate II, and without an 
unofficial tenure policy the non-renewal of an employment contract was not an adverse 
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action. The court of appeals, however, found that even without an official or unofficial 
tenure policy, non-renewal of an employment contract when the individual is seeking 
continued employment constitutes an adverse action. The court reasoned that the 
statute makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a new applicant 
seeking employment, so it is equally unlawful to discriminate a current employee who 
is seeking continued employment. The court stated: 
 
Were we to accept defendants’ arguments here, we would effectively rule that 
current employees seeking a renewal of an employment contract are not entitled 
to the same statutory protections under the discrimination as prospective 
employees. In other words, under defendant’s reasoning, an employee could bring 
a discrimination lawsuit if an employer refused to hire her based on her age and/or 
gender but not if the same employer failed to renew an employment contract for 
the same discriminatory reasons. We decline to adopt that flawed legal analysis, 
which is inconsistent with prior decisions of the Supreme Court and this court… 
There is simply no reason that the discrimination laws should not apply with 
equal force to an employer’s decision regarding a current employee who is denied 
a renewal of an employment contract. An employee seeking a renewal of an 
employment contract, just like a new applicant or a rehire after a layoff, suffers an 
adverse employment action when an employment opportunity is denied and is 
protected from discrimination in connection with such decisions under Title VII 
and the ADEA. 
 
 The court of appeals also found that the district court erred in finding that the 
circumstances did not give rise to an inference of age or gender discrimination. Leibowitz 
presented evidence that during the relevant time period, the defendants laid off five 
additional employees, all of whom were females over the age of fifty; that defendants 
reassigned Leibowitz’s duties to at least three male instructors; and that defendants did 
not consider Leibowitz for any vacant positions and attempted to fill one such position 
with a younger, male employee. The court of appeals found that this was sufficient to 
give rise to an inference of discrimination and rejected the district court’s reasoning that 
no inference of discrimination could be drawn because none of the male employees 
“specifically replaced [Leibowitz].” 
 
 The court of appeals rejected the district court’s alternative reasoning for granting 
summary judgment on the grounds that the defendants “had proffered a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the non-renewal, and [Leibowitz] had failed to provide 
evidence sufficient for a rational jury to find that the reason was pretextual.” The court of 
appeals found that the evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination, combined 
with additional evidence, created material issues sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
Although the defendants argued they did not renew the contract because of budgetary 
concerns, evidence that the budgetary concerns that existed in early 2002 diminished 
during the 2002-2003 school year and that the ILR hired twelve new employees during 
the relevant time period, combined with the evidence discussed earlier, was enough for a 
rational fact finder to conclude that the defendants’ reason was pretextual. 
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Furloughs in Hawaii disallowed 
 
Hawaii State Teachers Association v. Lingle, Civil No. 09-1372-06 KKS, First Circuit 
Court of Hawaii, July 29, 2009 
 
 
 Two unions brought suit against the Governor of Hawaii, the director of the 
Department of Human Resources Development and the director of the Department of 
Budget and Finance, alleging constitutional violations stemming from an executive action 
that unilaterally imposed a statewide furlough of public employees. Hawaii’s circuit court 
for the first circuit granted a temporary restraining order against defendants as to the 
unions’ first claim, but the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order as to 
the unions’ other claims.  
 
 Hawaii is one of five states affording constitutional protection to collective 
bargaining, and that protection extends to persons in private employment as well as 
persons in public employment. The relevant Constitutional provision states that, “persons 
in public employment shall have the right to organize for the purpose of collective 
bargaining as provided by law.” Hawaii further provides by statute that: 
 
it is the public policy of the State to promote harmonious and cooperative 
relations between government and its employees… [this policy is] best 
effectuated by recognizing the right of public employees to organize for the 
purpose of collective bargaining, [and requiring the public employers to negotiate 
with and enter into written agreements with exclusive representatives on matters 
of wages, hours, an other conditions of employment. 
 
Hawaii statutes also provide that, “employees shall have the right of self-organization… 
for the purpose of bargaining collectively” and that “this chapter shall take precedent 
over all conflicting statutes… and shall preempt all contrary… executive orders.” 
 
 The Governor, mayors of various counties, the chief justice and the Hawaii Health 
Systems Corporation Board were all parties to collective bargaining agreements – one of 
which contained a provision governing furloughs. In 2008, the teachers’ union and the 
public employees union (UPW) had a desire to modify and amend certain provisions of 
the agreements and bargaining began. At no time did any defendant indicate a desire to 
modify and amend the furlough provision or any other section of either the agreement 
with the teachers’ union or the UPW to provide for a three day furlough per month.  
 
 In order to reduce labor costs, including wages and benefits, on June 1, 2009 the 
Governor announced a unilateral decision to implement three furlough days per month 
for all state employees, effective July 1st and continuing for the next two years. This 
25
DiGiovanni: Legal Issues
Published by The Keep, 2010
 26 
decision eliminated the defendants’ obligation to engage in collective bargaining with 
respect to the three-day per month furloughs for all state employees for two years. A 
week later, the unions requested that the defendants negotiate over the decision and to 
cease and desist from unilaterally implementing the policy, but the defendants refused to 
bargain in good faith.  
 
 The executive order implementing the furloughs was issued by the Governor on 
June 24, 2009. The order defined furlough to mean “the placement of an employee 
temporarily and involuntarily in a non-pay and non-duty status by the employer because 
of lack of work funds.” The order also provided that state employee pay would be 
automatically adjusted by reducing monthly wages by one and a half days per pay period. 
Any employee who did not take the required number of furlough days would still endure 
the pay adjustment and would be directed to take all untaken furlough days before the 
end of the year. The pay adjustment would result in a reduction of state employee 
monthly wages by 14 to 16 percent.  
 
 In their first claim, the unions alleged that the decision and subsequent 
implementation of the executive order violates the right of public employees (represented 
by the unions) to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining in light of Article XIII, 
§ 2 of the Hawaii State Constitution. The court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a 
likeliness of success on the merits; the balance of irreparable damage favors a temporary 
injunction; and the public interest supports granting injunction and granted the motion for 
a temporary restraining order.  
 
 The court noted that although the Constitutional provision states “as provided by 
law,” the Hawaii Supreme Court has held that when a law, statute, or act withdraws core 
subjects that voters contemplated in the collective bargaining process, it is a violation of 
Article XIII, §2. The court did not understand the phrase “as provided by law” to mean 
that the legislature retains ultimate authority to govern the parameters of collective 
bargaining.  The court found that the imposition of furloughs “concerns core subjects of 
collective bargaining, such as wages,” because although a “mere delay” of wage 
payments is not a core subject, a reduction of wage payments is, and the furlough results 
in a 14 to 16 percent wage reduction for public employees. By removing the furlough 
issue from the bargaining process by executive order, the defendants' actions are 
inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that the State engage in negotiations 
concerning core subjects. The court held that the ordered furloughs cannot be imposed by 
unilateral action.  
 
 The court also rejected the State’s argument that the Hawaii Labor Relations 
Board has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the issue.  The Hawaii statute setting forth the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLRB states that “any controversy concerning 
unfair labor practices may be submitted to the board…but nothing herein shall prevent 
the pursuit of relief in courts of competent jurisdiction.” The court found that the case 
was properly before the circuit court for the issuance of injunctive and declaratory relief.  
 
 The defendants also relied on language in the relevant Hawaii statute to justify the  
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unilateral imposition of the furlough program. Defendants argued that the provision 
allowing for “managerial rights” permitted the type of action taken here. The court found 
that such a broad reading of the statute would defeat the intent of Article XIII, §2, and 
declined to accept the defendants' interpretation. 
 
  The section of the statute concerning when the Governor “can take actions as 
necessary to carry out the missions of the employer in cases of emergencies,” presented a 
separate issue. The court found that the State failed to establish that the fiscal concerns 
at issue constituted an emergency as defined by statute, and that “an emergency was 
not properly and validly raised by the Governor to outweigh a constitutional violation 
that this Court has already found.” 
 
 The court found that the first claim had a likelihood of success on the merits and 
next considered the balance of irreparable damage and the public interest. The court 
found that a constitutional violation itself is irreparable damage, and additionally that 
irreparable damage was established because the unilateral imposition of furloughs “goes 
to the heart of workers’ livelihood.” The court also found that the public interest supports 
granting the temporary restraining order, because “the government cannot violate 
constitutional rights of the people.” The court thus granted a temporary restraining order 
and also issued a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs as to count I.  
  
 In their second claim, the unions alleged that the defendants' actions would violate 
Article XVI, §2 of the Hawaii constitution, which guarantees that accrued retirement 
benefits shall not be diminished or impaired. The court found that as to this claim, the 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because the furlough 
is “prospective only,” with no affect on accrued benefits attributable to past services and 
by its plain language--that section of the Hawaii Constitution applies only to accrued 
benefits, not future benefits. The court denied the temporary restraining order as to count 
II.  
 
 In their third claim, the unions alleged that the budget and finance director’s 
decision to reduce the funds allotted to the Department of Education and University of 
Hawaii is a violation of the Hawaii statute which allows such action, or alternatively that 
the section violates the separation of powers doctrine.  
 
 The statute that allows the director of budget and finance to reduce the amount 
allotted states that no such reduction shall reduce “any allotted amount below the amount 
required to meet valid obligations or commitments previously incurred against the 
allotted funds.” The unions alleged that the collective bargaining agreement and the 
teachers’ next-year assignments were “valid obligations or commitments previously 
incurred.” However, the court rejected this argument because “teacher assignments do 
not sufficiently raise [an]… issue that their obligations or commitments previously 
incurred are impacted." The court also rejected the separation of powers argument, and 
found no likelihood of success on the merits as to claim three. The court denied the 
temporary restraining order as to count III as well.  
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Solicitation and distribution issues 
 
 Loparex LLC v. NLRB, 591 F.3d 540 (7th Cir., 2009) 
 
 In this case, the Seventh Circuit upheld a Board order finding that Loparex had 
engaged in unfair labor practices during a union organizing campaign, and subsequently 
ordering the company to take several affirmative steps to remedy the matter. 
 
 Loparex owns multiple production facilities around the country, manufacturing 
polycoated and silicone-coated papers and films. At one of these plants, in early 2007, 
some employee sentiment built for a union after the company announced several 
controversial employment policies. The company’s response to this union activity led to 
charges before the Board. 
 
 First, after some employees posted pro-union materials on the bulletin board, the 
company issued a policy requiring employees to obtain approval before placing any 
materials on the board. Second, after some employees attempted to distribute union 
literature in the parking lot, they were stopped by company officials. Third, after 
employees had passed out union buttons and had left some in the area of the time clock 
for employees to pick up, they were told they had violated company policy and told to 
stop. Fourth, company officials discouraged talk about a union during working hours. 
Fifth, the company informed all shift leaders that they were statutory supervisors and 
were prohibited from participating in union activities. 
 
 The Board had found all such conduct objectionable under section 8 (a) (1) of the 
Act, and the Seventh Circuit agreed. On the issue of bulletin board policy, the Court 
noted that “while the new bulletin board policy was facially neutral and 
nondisciminatorily applied, an employer may violate the Act if its motivation for a new 
policy is its hostility toward prounion activity.” In this case, since the company did not 
offer any other explanation for establishing the new bulletin board policy, and since there 
was evidence of company awareness of union activity and company’s policy in 
opposition to the drive, the Court found that the Board’s conclusion that the company 
was motivated by anti-union animus was supportable. 
 
 On the parking lot issue, the Court agreed with the Board that an employer may 
not prohibit all solicitation in a company parking lot  by off-duty employees. The Court 
also agreed with the Board that prohibiting the distribution of union buttons violated the 
Act. The prohibition against passing out buttons in the plant was overly broad, as 
employees could have believed that they were barred from soliciting near the time clock 
– a non-work area – during non-work time. 
 
 On the shift leader issue, the Court analyzed the Board’s finding that they were 
not supervisors and thus could not be restricted in their support for the union. The Court 
found sufficient facts to support the Board’s conclusions. Of particular note was the 
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Board’s finding that the shift leaders did not have authority to take either disciplinary or 
corrective action against employees because they were unable to control their crew 
members in any meaningful sense.  The Board also found that the shift leaders did not 
exercise independent judgment while assigning work.  
 
 
 
Nova Southeastern University, 2009 NLRB LEXIS 76 (NLRB, March 16, 2009) 
 
 In an opinion issued by an Administrative Law Judge, a University’s overly broad 
non-solicitation rule was found to be unlawful, as was the discipline imposed on 
employees of a contractor working at the University for violating that rule. The rule as 
stated in the Campus Safety and Traffic Handbook read: “No solicitation is allowed on 
the NSU campus or facility without the permission of the NSU Executive 
Administration.” 
 
 UNICCO contract employees working on the NSU campus were told they could 
not engage in solicitation or distribution of literature in accordance with this rule, and 
when one of the UNICCO employees violated this rule, he was disciplined. 
 
 The rule was deemed overly broad on its face, with no special circumstances 
justifying such a sweeping prohibition. By prohibiting on its face the lawful activity of 
employees to engage in solicitation during non-working time, the rule was in per se 
violation of the Act. In addition, the ALJ wrote: 
 
Any rule that requires employees to secure permission from their employer as a 
precondition to engaging in protected concerted activity on an employee’s free 
time and in nonwork areas is unlawful. Further, the Board held in Schnadig 
Corporation,265 NLRB 147 (1982) that the mere existence of an overly broad 
rule tends to restrain and interfere with employees’ rights under the Act even if 
the rule is not enforced. We find that the Respondent’s promulgation and 
maintenance of its no solicitation/no distribution rule constituted a per se violation 
of Section 8 (a)(1). 
 
The University tried to avoid liability by arguing that the rule was not enforced against its 
own employees, and that employees of a subcontractor working on campus do not have 
the same rights as the primary employer’s employees. In a sense, when such contract 
employees are doing anything other than working on the job, they are in essence 
“trespassers,” and the employer can restrict any solicitation on the premises by such 
individuals, just as the Supreme Court said it could in Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527.  
 
 The ALJ disagreed, noting that the Board has held that “a subcontractor’s 
employees may engage in solicitation and distribution among co workers even while 
working on the property of a contractor" [Southern Services, 300 NLRB 1154 (1990), 
enfd. 954 F. 2d 700 (11th Cir., 1992)]. Moreover, Lechmere involved non-employee 
union organizers trespassing on employer property and attempting to organize the 
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employer’s employees by leafleting and other means. Here, the subcontractor’s 
employees were not trespassers but had a legitimate right to be on campus. In striking the 
appropriate balance of rights, then, allowing subcontractor employees to legitimately 
solicit one another when they are legally on the primary employer’s property is to be 
favored. 
 
 When the relationship situates the subcontract employees’ workplace 
continuously and exclusively upon the contracting employer’s premises, the contracting 
employer’s rules purporting to restrict that subcontract employee’s rights to distribute 
literature among other employees of the subcontractor must satisfy the test of Republic 
Aviation v NLRB, 324 U.S. 79 (1945). 
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